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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
METALS MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
BANK OF COMMERCE, 
a Utah corporation, 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. This appeal presents the question of whether there 
is any valid reason or grounds for overturning the Trial 
Court's finding that the aluminum railings used to direct 
customer traffic and for decorative purposes in the re-
spondent's bank are simply personal property and do not 
constitute a ubuilding, structure or improvement of the 
land" as that term is used in Section 14-2-1 of the Utah 
Code Annotated. 
B. The lower court sitting without a jury after hav-
ing considered the evidence presented by both sides, found 
that such aluminum railings were not in the nature of an 
improvement to the structure and were, therefore, per-
sonal property not subject to the Utah Private Contracts 
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statute. Accordingly, the lower court entered judgment 
for the defendant and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. 
C. Because the facts as set forth in appellant's brief 
tend to be argumentive in favor of plaintiff's case, re-
spondent sets forth the following as his statement of facts. 
In the spring of 1963, respondent leased a bank build-
ing in Magna, Utah for the purpose of conducting a com-
mercial banking business. Under the terms of the lease, 
the building was to be remodeled by the lessor to meet 
certain requirements of the lessee. The lease anticipated 
that all furnishings contained in the bank building would 
be furnished by the lessee. Prior to opening its banking 
business, respondent contracted with Arnold Drews of 
Modern Ornamental Iron Works for certain aluminum 
railings and gates. Drews submitted a bid for this work 
of $1,457.10 which was accepted by respondent (Dep. p. 
7). Drews requested an advance payment on the railings 
representing that a lower price could be obtained if he 
had the cash to pay for the materials at the time they 
were ordered. Respondent, through its agent, C. I. Can-
field, advanced $1,200.00 upon the representation of 
Drews (Dep. p. 5) Drews, without respondent's knowl-
edge or consent, contracted with the appellant for the 
construction of these railings and agreed to pay appellant 
$1,748.00 for the railings. He represented to the appel-
lant that the railings were constructed for the Idaho State 
Bank. Drews picked up the railings from appellant and 
installed them in respondent's bank. Respondent then 
paid him for the railings. Drews failed to pay appellant 
for the railings and when appellant discovered that the 
railings were, in fact, in respondent's bank, it made de-
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mand on respondent for payment. Since respondent had 
already made payment for the railings, it refused to pay 
a second time whereupon appellant commenced action, 
under the Utah Private Contracts Act, Section 14-2-2 of 
the Utah Code Annotated, to recover the reasonable value 
of its materials. Respondent defended this action and the 
Trial Court sitting without a jury, and after having con-
sidered the evidence presented by both sides, found that 
such aluminum railings were personal property not sub-
ject to the Utah Private Contracts Act. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POIN'T I 
IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FO·R RELIEF UNDER 
THE UTAH PRIVATE CONTRACTS STATUTE 
IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE PROPERTY IN 
QUESTION BE ANNEXED TO THE LAND OR 
SOME PERMANENT STRUCTURE UPON IT WITH 
THE INTENTION OF MAKING SUCH PROPERTY 
A PERMANENT PART OF THE LAND OR STRUC-
TURE. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE IN QUESTION IS PENAL IN 
NATURE, IN THAT IT IMPOSES A DOUBLE LIA-
BILITY ON THE OWNER OF PROPERTY WHO 
PAYS AN UNBONDED CONTRACTOR, AND 
THEREFORE IT SHOULD BE STRICTLY CON-
STRUED. 
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POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT, HAVING PREVAILED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT, IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE 
APPELLATE COURT VIEW THE EVIDENCE AND 
EVERY FAIR INFERENCE AND INTENDMENT 
ARISING THEREFROM IN THE LIGHT MOST FAV-
ORABLE TO IT. AND IF WHEN SO, REGARDED, 
THERE IS ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, OiR, AS 
SOMETIMES STATED ANY REASONABLE BASIS IN 
THE EVIDENCE, TO SUPPOIR T THE FINDING 




IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR RELIEF UNDER 
THE UTAH PRIVATE CONTRACTS STATUTE 
IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE PROPERTY IN 
QUESTION BE ANNEXED TO· THE LAND OR 
SOME PERMANENT STRUCTURE UPON IT WITH 
THE INTENTION OF MAKING SUCH PROPERTY 
A PERMANENT PART OF THE LAND OR STRUC-
TURE. 
The statute provides in pertinent part as follows: 
u14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and ma-
terialmen. The owner of any interest in land enter-
ing into a contract, involving $500 or more, for the 
construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of, 
any building, structure or inzprovement upon land 
shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain 
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the 
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contract price, with good and sufficient sureties, 
conditioned for the faithful performance of the 
contract and prompt payment for material fur-
nished and labor performed under the contract. 
Such bond shall run to the owner and to all other 
persons as their interest may appear; and any per-
son who has furnished materials or performed labor 
for or upon any such building, structure or im-
provement, payment for which has not been made, 
shall have a direct right of action against the sure-
ties upon such bond for the reasonable value of the 
materials furnished or labor performed, not ex-
ceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed 
upon; which right of action shall accrue forty days 
after the completion, or abandonment, or default 
in the performance, of the work provided for in 
the contract. 
((The bond herein provided for shall be ex-
hibited to any person interested, upon request. 
u14-2-2. Failure to require bond-Direct lia-
bility. Any person subject to the provisions of this 
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and 
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein 
required, shall be personally liable to all persons 
who have furnished materials or performed labor 
under the contract for the reasonable value of such 
materials furnished or labor performed, not ex-
ceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed 
upon." Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
In a recent case involving this statute, the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah stated the rule under this 
statute as follows: 
uln order to qualify under these statutes it is 
necessary that there be an annexation to the land, 
or to some permanent structure upon it, so that the 
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materials in question can properly be regarded as 
having become a part of the realty; or a fixture 
appurtenant to it; and this must have been done 
with the intention of making it a permanent part 
thereof." King Bros. Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Cont-
pany, 13 U 2nd 339, 342; 374 P 2nd 254 (1962) 
Considering these authorities, it seems clear that the 
Utah rule as to the application of the statute in question 
requires that in order for property to be covered, it must 
be annexed to the land or structure with an intention of 
making it a perntanent part of such land or structure. 
In the case of Westinghouse Electric Supply Com-
pany v. Hawthorn, ISO P.2d SS, 57 {1944) a case cited 
as authority for the rule announced by the Court in the 
King Bros. Case, Supra, after finding that the law relating 
to fixtures applied and that the intention with which a 
chattel is placed upon real estate is determinative in ques-
tions where doubt exists, the Court set forth the following 
tests for determining the presence or absence of intent: 
uThe intent is not to be gathered from testi-
mony of the actual state of the mind of the party 
making the annexation * * * but is to be inferred, 
when not determined by an express agreement, 
from the nature of the article affixed, the relation 
and situation to the freehold of the party making 
the annexation, the manner of the annexation, and 
the purpose for which it is made." 
Since there was no express agreement between the 
vendor and vendee in the instant case as to whether the 
railings in question were supposed to be permanent fix-
tures, the four principal tests for determining intention, 
as set out by the court in Westinghouse Electric, Supra, 
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and quoted above, become the governing criteria, i.e. the 
nature of the article; the relation and situation to the 
freehold of the party making annexation; the manner of 
annexation and the purpose for which annexation was 
made. It is obvious from the most cursory review of the 
evidence in this case, that under this and any other tests, 
the trial Court correctly determined that the railings in 
question were not and were never intended to become part 
of the real estate. 
(a) uThe nature of the article." The railings involved 
in this case were made from aluminum bars and were de-
signed to be and are in fact easily portable 1 I as shown by 
defendant's Exhibit D-5 and by the testimony of respond-
ent's Vice President (Rec. 11, 12) the railings were con-
structed and attached in such a way that they can be 
moved from place to place on the bank premises or can 
be removed entirely if the volume of business makes it 
necessary for them to be removed. These plans for the 
use of the railings were communicated to the lessor of re-
spondent's building and among respondent's officers. (R 
17, 18, 19. Dep. p. 10, lines 8-10) With regard to the de-
sign of the railings, Mr. C. I. Canfield, Vice President of 
the respondent, stated at pages 12, 13, 16 and 17 of the 
Record. 
uQ. well, just the general theory of the plan 
that was used for the bank. Was there any one 
central idea that prevailed in planning the bank? 
I I It is interesting to note that a female secretary of the Vice President 
of respondent removed one of the rail~ngs invo_lved. i_n this case in a t;natter 
of five minutes using only a screw dnver. This rathng was then earned to 
the Trial Court. (Rec. 13, 14). 
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uA. Well, he set up the plan of the bank, the 
inside of the bank, so that it can be ad jus ted and 
moved as situations require it in our operation. 
uQ. Thank you. At the time you planned the 
bank building did you contemplate the possibility 
that you might to have to move to a different 
building? 
u.A. Well, we discussed it; there is always that 
possibility. 
u.Q. And if you did move to another building 
did you contemplate the necessity of moving the 
interior facilities of the bank? 
u.A. He set it up so that all of the equipment 
we have got belongs to the company, so that we can 
move it if we want to." 
In the negotiation of the lease agreement, respond-
ent's officers anticipated that they would want to move 
the railings and other furnishings from the leased prem-
ises and they specifically requested the inclusion of a pro-
vision in the lease permitting removal of these furnishings 
(Dep. p. 11, lines 1 thru 5 and lines 14 thru 21) (Dep·. 
p. 16 and 17, lines 1 thru 9) . Since respondents were les-
sees, it can be presumed that they had no intention to en-
rich the freehold. See Westinghouse Electric Supply v. 
Hawthorn, Supra at 58. 
Testimony of a witness engaged in the production of 
such railings indicates that they are frequently moved 
from place to place by banking institutions and are treated 
much the same as items of furniture. (R. 31, line 1-7, 16-
24) 
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"MR. DAI-ILSTROM: Have you had occa-
sion to install these aluminum railings in any other 
buildings where your customers have been engaged 
in the banking business? 
uTHE WITNESS: Yes, I have. 
uQ. How are they generally installed? 
uA. They are generally fastened to the floor 
by one means or another, or the walls as the next 
thing. 
uQ. What single bank is your principal cus-
tomer for the production of these railings? 
uA. I have done a great deal of work-or con-
siderable work for the First Security Bank. 
uQ. Have you ever been called upon by the 
First Security Bank to tnove any railings from one 
building to another. 
'-"A. Not from one building to another, but 
from one location in a building to another location 
in the building." 
Moreover, as pointed out by Mr. Canfield at the trial, 
there were and are plans to move the railings from place 
to place in the bank or to remove them entirely. In short, 
these railings are much the same as the desks, telephones, 
bookkeeping machines, the sound system or the water 
cooler, all of which are attached in some way to the build-
ing but can be and would be moved from place to place or 
removed from the building entirely if circumstances 
dictated. 
Items such as this and heavier, more major pieces 
of equipment have long been held by the courts to be the 
type of article which constitutes personal property rather 
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than leinable realty. See Ward v. To1vn Tavern, 191 Or 
1,288 P 2nd 216,42 ALR 2nd 662, 667 (1951). A case 
holding a coffee urn, a steam chest, a soda fountain, a 
refrigerator and a vanity table not to be leinable because 
they were removable by the lessee owner at will. In the 
Westinghouse Electric case, Supra, the court found that 
electric motors, switches, upush buttons," upulleys" and 
((sliding rails" were not fixtures subject to a lein because 
of lack of evidence showing an intent to permanently affix 
them to the building. 
In its brief, appellant criticizes the lower court's de-
cision complaining that the lower court did not consider 
evidence presented by appellant that the railing was spec-
ifically constructed to fit specific requirements as to 
length, width and heighth supplied by Arnold Drews 
(App. Br. p. 5, 8, 10 and 13). The appellant cites the 
case of Knoff Woodwards Con~pany v. Zotales, 213 Minn. 
204, 6 N.W. 2d 264, 266 ( 1942) as holding that the special 
construction of the railings and gates shows they were in-
tended to constitute part of the building. 
Appellant seems to feel that the special construction 
of the railings is in itself determinative of the questions 
of whether the railings were part of the building. Actu-
ally the cases, including the case cited by the appellant, 
hold that special construction is only one of many minor 
factors to be considered in determining whether there 
was an intention to annex the property in question to the 
land. Actually the case cited by the appellant on page 6 
of his brief is distinguishable from the present case in 
that it involved a suit against a land owner and a statute 
requiring notice of non responsibility of land owners. The 
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property in question in that case was a wall dividing the 
building into two parts. Obviously, this case and the con-
clusions drawn from it by appellant are not applicable in 
the present case. And, as pointed out above, the special 
construction of these railings was not to permanently 
fix them to the building but to allow for their movement 
from place to place in the building or to be removed al-
together. Also because of their peculiar design they could 
not have been used in the building for any business except 
the banking business. The design was for portability, not 
permanence. There is no rule of law holding that special 
construction or design in and of itself makes an item of 
personal property become real property. In each case it 
is necessary to consider the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the special construction or design. 
On page 6 of its brief, appellant claims that the court 
did not consider that the desirability as part of the archi-
tectual design or finish of the building is determinative of 
the question of whether the railings are realty or per-
sonalty. In the first place, no evidence was introduced at 
trial to show that these railings were in any way part of 
the architectural finish of the building. In fact, they were 
considered to be furnishings by the persons who designed 
and constructed the building (Dep. 14 and 1 S). Secondly, 
even if the railings were desirable as part of the finish of 
the building, they would not, under the Utah rule, auto-
matically become part of the realty. 
Appellant cites certain testimony at page 7 of his 
brief which he contends the Trial Court should have con-
sidered as an indication that respondent intended that the 
railings remain attached to the premises. However, he fails 
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to consider that the basic thrust of respondent's testimony 
indicated the lack of such an intention. 
Continuing on where appellant left off at (Dep. 15, 
line 9-11, 16, lines 20-24, 17, lines 3-9) 
uMR. MECHAM: So that any of these fix-
tures could be taken out? 
uA. Yes, or moved to any place we want to 
at our convenience." 
* * * 
uQ. Why did you want it in? 
uA. So we could remove these fixtures and 
equipment. Mr. Rokich rewrote the lease with 
these things in and it was duly executed and signed, 
but the effective da~e was not made until I give the 
go ahead sign as of the first of May, 1963.)1 
uQ. At the time, as you have described, you 
had this provision put in the lease, did you antici-
pate having to use this provision? 
uA. Well, the only way I can answer that is 
if our business develops the way I had hoped and 
still hope it will that I know from past experience 
we would have to make changes in the bank." 
In essence, what the appellant has claimed is that the 
Trial Court, in considering the facts, has decided against 
him as a factual matter, without considering the evidence, 
such as it was, presented by him. Appellant fails to realize 
that the trial court may well have considered his evidence 
and rejected it in favor of the weight of evidence showing 
a lack of any intent to permanently annex the railings in 
question to the real estate. 
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(b) uThe relation and situation to the freehold of the 
party making annexation." The respondent occupies the 
premises as a lessee and, therefore, has no interest in en-
riching the freehold for his own benefit, as he might have 
if he were the owner of the freehold. (Dep. p. 15) . The 
appellant spends a considerable part of its brief discussing 
the effect of the lease agreement between respondent and 
its lessor. Appellant claims that as a third party to this 
agreement, it is not legally bound by the terms of the 
agreement. 
In the first place, respondent has made no claim that 
appellant is legally bound by the terms of the lease agree-
ment. The lease is introduced merely as evidence of the 
intention of the party annexing the property not to perm-
anently affix such property to the realty. The consider-
ation of the lease for that purpose is in no way dependent 
on the question of whether appellant is legally bound by 
the terms of the lease. 
Secondly, appellant cites the case of Hammond Lum-
ber Company v. Gardner, 84 Cal. App, 701, 258 P. 612 
( 1927) as standing for the proposition that in order for 
intent to be binding on third persons, it must be apparent 
intent. The Hammond case has no resemblence whatso-
ever to the case before us. In Hammond, the court was 
interpreting a California statute which imposed a lein 
upon the owner of the real estate where he failed to post 
notice of non responsibility. Of course, this lien only 
applied to real estate. The California statute defined real 
estate as follows: 
"'-A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when 
it is attached to it by roots, as in the case of trees, 
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vines or shrubs; or imbedded in it, as in the case of 
walls; or premanently resting upon it, as in the case 
of buildings; or permanently attached to what is 
thus permanent, as by means of cement, plaster, 
nails, bolts or screws." 
This definition in no way resembles the definition 
under the Utah statute and cases, since it depends on the 
method of attachment rather than intent to permanently 
affix. In the Hammond case, the court found that no 
notice had been given and, therefore, upheld a lower 
court's decision holding that the land owners property was 
subject to a lien. For these reasons, we feel any consider-
ation of the Hanz1nond case in conjunction with the case 
at bar would be erroneous. 
(c) uThe manner of the annexation." The railings, 
in question were attached to the floor by small screws ap·-
proximately % of inch in length. (Rec. 14 Exh. D-3). 
In some places the railings were screwed into wooden abut-
ments that were attached to the wall by screws of approxi-
mately the same length. (Rec. 14). In order to stabilize 
the railings, holes approximately 1 inch in diameter were 
drilled into the floor as indicated in Exhibit D 6, 7, 8, 9 
(Rec. 13, 14) . 
The fact that railings were designed so as to be re-
movable without any material injury to the premises and 
that the supply of matching tile was retained to cover the 
screwholes in the floor is a further indication of a lack of 
intent to permanently affix the railings, and in fact indi-
cates an intent to have the railings removed. (Rec. 19, 
line 23 to 30, 20, line 1 to 6): 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
uMR. DAHLSTROM: Would you explain to 
the Court what damage to the floor you might 
contemplate by moving these railings? 
uTHE WITNESS: Well, by moving the rail-
ings all that would be necessary to replace so that 
it would be impossible to tell there were railings 
there, would be to remove one piece of the vinyl 
tile, which we have other sections for in this event, 
and replace it with another section for this one, and 
put a plug in the hole where the bolt goes and a 
new piece of tile on it. 
((MR. DAHLSTROM: Was this tile pur-
chased and kept in contemplation of moving the 
railing around? 
uTHE WITNESS: Yes, or in the event we 
had to replace any other section." 
On page 6 of its brief, appellant claims that the Court 
improperly considered testimony that the railings were re-
movable without material injury to the premises as an in-
dication that they were personal property. The appellant 
has cited one case, decided in 1891, involving a mortgage 
in which the Court found that the ability to remove with-
out material injury to the premises was not the controlling 
factor. However the appellants have not considered a 
host of other authorities holding to the contrary. See 
Braddees v. Smith, 121 Ala, 335, 26 So. 34, 77 Am St. 
Rep. 61; Smith v. Bush, 173 Okla. 172, 44 P 2d 921 1 D 1 
ALR 330; Standard Oil Co. v. La Grasse Supra Auto Serv-
ice, 217 Wis. 237, 258 NW 791, 99 ALR 60; and 22 Am 
Jur, Fixtures 539, P. 748 which states: 
uThe majority rule is that if mortagee of land 
leases it to third person and gives him a right tore-
move from premises any chattles, he may attach, 
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such chattles do not become subject to the mort-
gage if they can be removed without injury to the 
realty." 
It seems only logical that the a hili ty to remove the 
chattles would be properly considered to be one of the 
facts and circumstances to be looked to in determining 
intent to annex the property in question to the freehold. 
In the present case, the railings could be removed without 
harm to the freehold, thus, evidencing an intent not to 
permanently affix them to the real estate. 
-- The application of this rule necessarily requires a con-
sideration of all of the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the annexation of any items of personality to real 
estate to determine the intention of the party making the 
annexation to permanently affix the personality to reality. 
In this case, after considering such facts and circumstances 
as it saw fit, the Trial Court decided that the bank did not 
affix the railings with an intention to make them part of 
the real estate. 
(d) uThe purpose for which annexation was made." 
The purpose for which these railings are used, to direct 
traffic within the bank and to decorate the bank's interior, 
shows a lack of an reason for their permanent attachment 
to the structure. (Rec. 15 line 20-24) If the building was 
used for a purpose other than the conduct of a banking 
business, these railings would not be needed to direct 
traffic or for decoration and would be removed. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE IN QUESTION, SINCE IT IS 
PENAL IN NATURE, IN THAT IT IMPOSES A 
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DOUBLE LIABILITY ON THE OWNER OF PROP-
ERTY WHO PAYS AN UNBONDED CONTRACT-
OR, SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED. 
In the case of Backus v. Hooten, 4 U 2d 364, 294 P 
2d 703 ( 1956), the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, 
in considering the application of the statute involved here, 
held that because of its penal nature, in imposing double 
liability on unbonded property owners, the statute in ques-
tion should be strictly construed. The same rule has been 
followed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Greenblutt v. 
Boldin, (Fla 1957) 94 So 2d 355, 59 ALR 2d, 877. A 
strict construction of this statute requires that in order 
to receiveth the benefits of the statute, a claimant has to 
clearly establish that the property on which he hopes to 
place a lien comes within the provisions of the statute. In 
the present case, the only evidence introduced by the ap-
pellant to meet this burden was evidenced that the railing 
in question had been manufactured by it according to 
specifications as to length and height furnished it by Mr. 
Arnold Drews. (Rec. p. 4) As has been pointed out above, 
nothing can be inferred with respect to intent to perma-
nently affix from the fact that an item was specially fab-
ricated as to length and height. If the statute· in question 
was strictly construed, this evidence would be insufficient 
to establish entitlement to the benefits of the statute. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT, HAVING PREVAILED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT, IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE 
APPELLATE COURT VIEW THE EVIDENCE AND 
EVERY FAIR INFERENCE AND INTENDMENT 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
ARISING THEREFROM IN THE LIGHT MOST FA V-
ORABLE TO IT. AND IF WHEN SO' REGARDED, 
THERE IS ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, OR, AS 
SOMETIMES, STATED ANY REASONABLE BASIS 
IN THE EVIDENCE, TO SUPPORT THE FINDING 
MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT, IT WILL NOT BE 
DISTURBED. 
In the case of John C. Cutler Assn. v. D. Jay Stores, 
279 P 2d 700, 3 U 2d 107 ( 1955) a case where the Trial 
Judge was the trier of fact, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that uwhere a defenden t has prevailed in the Trial Court, 
he is entitled to have the Appellate Court view the evidence 
and every fair inference and intendment arising therefrom 
in the light most favorable to it, and if when so regarded, 
there is any substantial evidence, or, as sometimes stated, 
any reasonable basis in the evidence, to ~upport the finding 
made by the Trial Court it will not he disturbed." 
Appellant devotes his entire brief to arguments that 
the Trial Court failed, on the facts presented, to decide in 
his favor. In light of the rule stated above, respondent can 
see no reason for the court to consider them here. Appel-
lant had an opportunity to present evidence in support of 
his claim to the Trial Court. Appellant used that oppor-
tunity by presenting only evidence that the railings in 
question were manufactured by appellant in accordance 
with the specifications as to length and height provided 
by Arnold Drews (Rec. 3, 4, 5 and 6). Appellant cannot 
now complain when the Trial Court, after having fully 
considered the evidence presented by both sides (including 
any inferences favorable to appellant that may have been 
drawn from evidence introduced by respondent) reaches 
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a conclusion favorable to respondent. If this court were 
to change the ruling of the lower court, it would be plac-
ing itself in the position of the trier of fact. 
In appellants conclusion, he erroneously states that 
the evidence should be considered in the light most fav-
orable to the appellant citing King Brother, Supra. A cur-
sory review of the King Brothers case indicates that the 
rule as to consideration of evidence in the light most fav-
orable to the appellant only ap·plies where a motion to dis-
miss the complaint is granted by the Trial Court. In this 
present case, no such motion was granted, and therefore, 
it is as clear as the sun on a cloudless day that the rule as 
to consideration of evidence in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff has absolutely no application here, and, it is even 
clearer than the sun on a cloudless day that after consid-
ering the evidences pre sen ted by both sides, the Trial Court 
was perfectly justified in deciding for respondent. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
Conclusion 
Based on the evidence in the record which shows that 
respondent had no intention to permanently annex the 
railings in question to the land or the structures on it, and 
the rule of law requiring a strict construction of the statute 
in question because of its penal nature and the established 
rule of law requiring the app:ellate court to rely on fac-
tual determinations of the Trial Court when supported by 
evidence, it can safely be concluded that the determination 
of the Trial Court was made in accordance with the law 
and facts and should not be overturned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
JOHN A. DAHLSTROM 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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